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POLLING ESTABLISHMENT: JUDICIAL REVIEW, DEMOCRACY,
AND THE ENDORSEMENT THEORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE-COMMENTARY ON MEASURED ENDORSEMENT
JAMIN

B.

RASKIN*

INTRODUCTION

How do we know when a government-produced holiday display
crosses a constitutional line and impermissibly endorses religion?
Shari Seidman Diamond and Andrew Koppelman argue that courts
should rely on the techniques and methodologies of public opinion
polling to survey the public and determine whether such displays endorse religion and therefore violate the Establishment Clause.' The
authors support the point by developing an analogy to litigation
under the Lanham Act, where courts regularly use evidence from public opinion poll results to determine whether there is legally salient
"consumer confusion" in a trademark dispute.2
The theoretical problem with this analogy is that the issue at stake
under the Lanham Act is whether there is a likelihood of actual consumer confusion being generated by the use of a particular name brand
or logo.3 But the issue at stake under an Establishment Clause endorsement analysis is not whether citizens will actually perceive there to
be an endorsement of religion, but whether there is an endorsement
of religion.4 This inquiry, properly understood, requires the court to
determine primarily whether the government has a religious or secu*
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insightful comments.
1. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD.
L. REv. 713, 716 (2001) (proposing that "in cases involving allegations that the Establishment Clause has been violated, a systematic assessment of reactions from members of the
community to the display or symbol at issue can assist courts in determining whether the
particular display conveys a message of religious endorsement").

2. Id. at 736-56.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1998) ("Any person who ...uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device... which is likely to cause confusion... shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such
act.").
4. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(characterizing actual government endorsement of religion as a "direct infringement" of
the Establishment Clause); id. at 694 ("Every government practice must be judged in its
unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of
religion." (emphasis added)).
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lar purpose for its display.5 When the government provides something of monetary value to a religious entity, and the provision is not
part of a universal program (like the distribution of police, fire, or
sewage services), it constitutes an impermissible subsidy.6 Similarly,
when the government selectively appropriates something of a symbolic value to a religious entity, this also constitutes an impermissible
endorsement. 7 This legal finding ultimately turns, I will argue, not on
the subjective perceptions of either a majority or minority faction
within the population, but on the Court's objective understanding of
the purpose and function of the government's conduct. If the purpose and function of the government's policy is to traffic and take
sides in the realm of divine mystery, magic, theological faith, religious
belief, and theological organization-as opposed to human perception, reasoned inquiry and debate, the scientific method, and logicthen the Establishment Clause, an indispensable component of our
Enlightenment Constitution, is violated. The purpose of the Establishment Clause is to require government to act within the dictates
and realm of reason rather than superstition and metaphysics.
The Establishment Clause's purpose-based inquiry has little, formally, to do with future public opinion or perception, but everything
to do with the objective purpose and function of the government's
display, as determined through an inquiry that should focus on answering the following question: given everything we know about the
historical and social context, what is the most plausible reason for the
5. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court combined criteria that it had
developed over several years for evaluating Establishment Clause cases and spelled out a
three-pronged test for evaluating alleged government endorsement of religion: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion." Id at 612-13 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). I would try to collapse, or at least narrow, the first two prongs
by reformulating them to say that an enactment must have a secular purpose and a secular
function. If we look at a statute or policy from a holistic and omniscient distance, its purpose
and function in society will appear to be roughly the same.
6. See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) ("[W]hen government
directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be
seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion ... it
'provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations' . . . . (quoting
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment))).
7. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (holding symbolic endorsement of religion invalid because it "'sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community"' (quoting
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).

2001]

POLLING ESTABLISHMENT

763

government placing particular religious elements in a public holiday
display? The effects-based inquiry under the Establishment Clause
similarly requires us to determine, according to Justice O'Connor,
"what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display."'
This part of the analysis is probably redundant, because it invites the
Court to examine the same issue once again: what is a fair understanding of the purpose of a governmental enactment or display? In
any event, a better statement of the effects test will be "what viewers
may fairly understand to be the purpose of the government's placement of
religious elements in the display."
At any rate, even if we keep the effects prong as a separate part of
Establishment Clause analysis, the effects test, as read by Justice
O'Connor, clearly must also be based on a standard of objective reasonableness. Contra Diamond and Koppelman, neither a majority nor a
minority's actual perception of secular-ness or religiosity should be, or
can be, controlling of whether or not illicit endorsement has taken
place. And if the public's actual perceptions are not controlling-that
is, if the court itself must determine the constitutional meaning of the
semiotics of a government-erected display, as I will insist-then it is
hard to see how the actual perceptions of a certain randomly assembled group of citizens are even relevant to the endorsement analysis. It
is more likely to be distracting and misleading.
Nonetheless, the authors have offered us a creative and useful
thought experiment that concentrates the mind and advances our understanding of what Establishment Clause jurisprudence-and also,
importantly, as we shall see, Equal Protection jurisprudence-should
really concern.
I.

THE PURPOSE OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AS THE CENTRAL ISSUE

The authors seem to believe, and I would agree, that an important meaning of the Establishment Clause is captured by Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test.9 But they want to use the emergence
of the endorsement test to abolish doctrinal focus on the purpose of
governmental action, which I believe must be the central concern of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. They assert that the "central issue should be what message is actually communicated."1 They reject
Justice O'Connor's view under which "laws would be condemned if
8. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
9. See Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 726 ("We think that the endorsement
test has a sound basis in the Establishment Clause, and that it can be operatonalized in a
clear way.").
10. Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
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they were enacted with the intention of endorsing religion. Aside
from the notorious difficulties of discerning governmental intent,
none of the harms that the Establishment Clause seeks to prevent are
contingent on a decisionmaker's intent."1
But here the authors invite us to shift our focus by misstating
what the purpose test is really about. The question is not whether the
decisionmaker, in his or her own mind, intended to endorse religion,
but whether the government has enacted a policy or display that can
most plausibly be understood as having the purpose and function of
endorsing religion. This purpose inquiry is the essential interpretive
methodology not just in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but in
free speech and Equal Protection jurisprudence as well. In the Establishment Clause context, the purpose is determined by asking, given
everything we know about the historical and social context, what is the
most plausible purpose for the government having placed religious
elements in a symbolic display.1 2
It is Justice O'Connor's apparent straddling of the line between
an objective and subjective analysis that leads the authors to zero in on
the subjective element of "audience" interpretations and discard the
objective purpose analysis altogether. They say we should turn the
focus away from the purpose of a challenged governmental action or
decision because of "the notorious difficulties of discerning governmental intent,"13 and because "[a] n endorsement test that invalidates
laws that have a religious meaning to their enactors would deny to
religious people their right to participate in politics."14
Neither of these claims about purpose-based analysis is convincing. Consider the Supreme Court's most recent Establishment Clause
decision, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.' The Santa Fe ma11. Id. at 742-43 (footnote omitted).
12. The Establishment Clause effects test seems unnecessary because it is redundant in
the context of the holiday display analysis. If the purpose analysis here is defined as the
purpose of the government display in the eyes of a reasonable person, and the effects
analysis of a display is defined as "what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of
the display," Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring), then it seems as if the
purpose and effects tests collapse into one. In both cases we are asking how a reasonable
person would interpret, given all relevant facts and contexts, a governmental entity's decision to incorporate religious elements into a holiday display. Of course, whether the effects test plays a more meaningful and independent role under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), in cases of arguably unconstitutional materialsubsidies is an analytically
distinct question. At any rate, even under Justice O'Connor's statement of the doctrine,
the effects analysis in a display case must relate to reasonable perceptions of governmental purpose-"what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display."
13. Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 742-43.
14. Id. at 743.
15. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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jority, which invalidated a Texas law allowing elective prayer over the
loudspeaker at high-school football games, found the "evolution of
the current policy" to be most striking' 6 and identified the parties'
stipulation that students were voting to determine "'whether a student
would deliver prayer at varsity football games'-"7 as a key fact. Moreover, the majority found that the language of the actual policy "by its
terms invite[d] and encourage[d] religious messages."" This evidence compelled a judicial inference that "the specific purpose of the
policy was to preserve a popular 'state-sponsored religious
practice.'"9

There does not seem to be, in fact, much difficulty with the majority's straightforward linguistic and contextual analysis of the governmental purpose behind the football prayers. But Diamond and
Koppelman's belief in the ultimate inscrutability, indeterminacy, and
plasticity of governmental purpose is apparently shared by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in Santa Fe because he viewed the evolution of the football prayer policy as merely reflecting the school
system's intent "to come within the governing constitutional law."2"
But Chief Justice Rehnquist's reading of the prayer policy completely misses the point of a purpose-based constitutional analysis. We
can cheerfully concede that the Texas authorities intended to "come
within" the First Amendment when it wrote its most recent and unconstitutional draft of a policy to allow prayer at football games. We
can even hypothesize that every governmental authority that has ever
violated the Constitution was, at the time, trying in good faith to
"come within the governing constitutional law." But a decisionmaker's determination to avoid conflict with a constitutional barrier in passing a law tells us nothing about the actual purpose of the
specific governmental action or whether a constitutional barrier was
actually crossed. "Purpose" here refers to what Matthew Adler helpfully calls "sentence-meaning," that is, the purposes that underlie and
render meaningful the actual language of a public enactment or policy itself.2 ' The purpose of a rule saying that "students may elect a
16. Id. at 309.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

310 (quoting App. at 65).
306.
309 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)).
323 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

21. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L.
REv. 1363, 1384 (2000) (explaining that "the 'sentence-meaning' of an official action is its
meaning pursuant to the very same kind of rules and conventions that assign meaning to a
well-formed English sentence" (footnote omitted)).
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fellow student to solemnize a game " 22 is to promote prayer or, if you
disagree with that, to promote secular solemnities at football games.
But it literally would be nonsense to say that the purpose of a policy
allowing students to elect a fellow student to "solemnize" a football
game was to "come within the governing constitutional law." Coming
within the governing constitutional law is, in this sense, never the legislative purpose behind public policy because there is no content or
direction to such a purpose. Of course, one hopes that conforming to
the Constitution is always a side considerationtaken into account when
public policy or legislation is being drafted, but this is different from it
being the law's purpose.
Diamond and Koppelman's misunderstanding of the purpose requirement is most obvious when they followJustice Scalia down a similar path of skepticism about invalidating laws based on impermissible
religious purposes. The authors say that their turn away from an intent standard is reinforced by the danger that it will threaten to undermine the legitimacy of political participation by religious people:
Some citizens are religious. If those citizens participate in
politics, their political actions will inevitably reflect their religious views ....

An endorsement test that invalidates laws

that have a religious meaning to their enactors would deny
to religious people their right to participate in politics.2 3
They go on to quote Justice Scalia, who states in Edwards v. Aguillard,2 4
that
[o]ur cases in no way imply that the Establishment Clause
forbids legislators merely to act upon their religious convictions. We surely would not strike down a law providing
money to feed the hungry or shelter the homeless if it could
be demonstrated that, but for the religious beliefs of the legislators, the funds would not have been approved.2 5
But, in trying to relax judicial scrutiny of improper religious purposes
in legislation, Justice Scalia has committed a basic fallacy, now repeated by Diamond and Koppelman: the confusion of individual legislators' personal and subjective motivationsfor supporting a law and the
22. The policy that permitted prayer at Texas high-school football games was similar to
the one that allowed prayer at high-school graduations. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 297. The
latter permitted students to "elect ... students to deliver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
invocations and benedictions for the purpose of solemnizing their graduation ceremonies." Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1999)).
23. Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 743.
24. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
25. Id. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 743.
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objective purpose of the legislative enactment itself The authors worry, as

does Justice Scalia, that if we use purpose or intent to determine
whether legislation violates the Establishment Clause, then laws providing food for the poor, school lunches, homeless shelters, and so
on, might be invalidated if the legislators voting for such laws happened to be motivated by private (or perhaps even constituent) religious views. 26
But what matters in Establishment Clause analysis, and constitu-

tional analysis generally, is not why a particular legislator favors a bill,
or even why all legislators favor a bill (this is what we would call
speaker-meaning), but what the legislative purpose (or sentence
meaning) of the enactment is. Thus, the purpose behind an ordinary
school lunch bill is the perfectly secular one of providing a nutritional
mid-day meal to all public school students-even if all of the legislators voting for it openly professed, on the floor of Congress, to vote
for it out of personal religious concerns. Even if people subjectively
perceived the school lunch bill as religious in character, it simply
would not be, because its existence is most plausibly understood as
answering to a secular and empirically demonstrable problem: hunger during the school day.
Similarly, even if every state legislator makes a speech about the

Ten Commandments during a debate over homicide laws, the law
against murder does not violate the Establishment Clause. This is because, whatever the legislators' personal motivations, murder laws
have a clearly definable secular legislative purpose: to protect human
life. The audience's perception that the law against homicide is a declaration of religious truth would be wholly irrelevant to analyzing its
constitutionality.
Conversely, secular motivations on the part of legislators cannot

rescue or sanitize laws or policies that are fundamentally religious in
character. Thus, assume that 100 United States senators vote to erect
crosses and statues ofJesus on all federal properties on Christmas Day,
but all do so for essentially secular personal reasons-for example, to
accommodate the wishes of a majority of the public, to guarantee
their reelection, to prevent legislation that would sweep further to

erect such displays all year-round, and so on. Despite their completely
secular personal motivations in supporting the law, the law itself
would violate the Establishment Clause because the only remotely
26. See Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 743 (quotingJustice Scalia's dissent in
Aguillard and asserting that "[a]n endorsement test that invalidates laws that have a religious meaning to their enactors would deny to religious people their right to participate in
politics").
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plausible and coherent legislative purpose behind it is to promote and
endorse a religious practice and belief. The subjective desires or
thoughts of the legislators are irrelevant.
Diamond and Koppelman's audience-based account of endorsement falls of its own weight and cannot begin to replace a purpose
analysis. A standard objection to their audience-based argument is
that the public, or some part of it, could give an eccentric, irrational,
or indefensible reading to a government action. An intolerant religious majority could easily interpret governmental accommodation of
minority religious practices-providing Jewish or Muslim public
school students kosher foods, letting Hindu members of the armed
services or police wear turbans, and so on-as unlawful governmental
endorsements of religious practices. Conversely, a majority supportive
of an establishmentarian practice by government-say, placing a
Christmas nativity scene at city hall-could and would (either in good
faith or bad faith) perceive this display simply as a normal recognition
of seasonal community celebration. It is hard to see why the exact
same governmental action in two different towns-say, posting the
twenty-third psalm with a picture of Jesus Christ on the door of city
hall-should be either permissible or impermissible depending only
on the reaction of the local community. Indeed, on this theory, it is
hard to see how we would ever have any operative Establishment
Clause precedent that we could consult for guidance, because we
would never know whether a display is constitutional or not until the
live audience actually perceives its present meaning. There is simply no

way to escape from the intractable problems of subjectivity inherent in
a "subjective group perception" test applied to the Establishment
Clause. The purpose analysis provides us with the theory we need.
II.

REFINING THE ENDORSEMENT TEST IN THE HOLIDAY DISPLAY CASES

The authors canvass the rather raggedy doctrine in this field and
assert that, given continuing controversy about the social meaning of
government action, what is needed in Establishment Clause adjudication-and Equal Protection as well-"is an authoritative way to resolve
disputes about social meaning."2 7 But the term "social meaning" is
ambiguous here. It could mean either the objective meaning of an enactment in society--this is the inquiry I favor-or it could mean society's
perception of the meaning of the enactment, which the authors favor.

But we do not actually need a more authoritative way to resolve
disputes about the social meaning of challenged government religious
27. Id. at 736.
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displays in the first sense. Constitutional adjudication by judges enforcing Establishment Clause values can work in a perfectly adequate
way.
It is true that we would appear to need such a guide, given the
almost comic hair-splitting by the Court in the Christmas cr&he cases.
In Lynch v. Donnelly,28 for example, the Court upheld the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island's inclusion of a Christmas cr&he in its annual
holiday display.29 But in Allegheny County v. ACLU," the Court invalidated a cr&he display on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny
County Courthouse in Pennsylvania."' The critical difference in the
treatment of the two nativity scenes was the relative proportion of religious and secular symbols and figures in the two displays. While the
Allegheny display featured only Jesus, Mary, Joseph, and the Wise
Men, in the manger scene in Bethlehem,3 2 the Pawtucket scene included not only the baby Jesus and the Wise Men, but also a Santa
Claus House with Santa distributing candy, a "SEASONS GREETINGS" sign, a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear.3 3 To Justice
O'Connor, these added secular elements changed "what viewers may
fairly understand to be the purpose of the display," and therefore "negate[d] any message of endorsement" of "the Christian beliefs represented by the creche."3 4
The semiotic gamesmanship invited by this mode of analysisadd two more candy canes, a reindeer, and some giant snowflakes to
offset those shepherds! -could be easily avoided by a more precise
doctrinal test for purpose and effect. Justice O'Connor's articulated
method for ascertaining whether the deployment of an object with
religious meaning has the effect of impermissibly endorsing religion is
to ask "what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the
display."3 5 Thus, in Pawtucket, she concluded that the robust mixture
of religious and secular symbols refuted any fair understanding that
the purpose of the display was a religious one. 6 But this formulation
of the effects prong of the endorsement test-what viewers may fairly
understand to be the purpose of a display-is far too broadly stated.
28. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
29. Id. at 685.
30. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
31. Id. at 578-79, 620-21.
32. Id. at 580.
33. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671; see also id. (noting that the display in Pawtucket was similar
to those found in "hundreds of towns or cities across the Nation-often on public
grounds-during the Christmas season").
34. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. See id.
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The real inquiry in determining whether there is an impermissible
purpose or effect of endorsement of religion in such a holiday scene
should require us to ask not merely "what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display," but also "what viewers may
fairly understand to be the purpose of the government's placement of religious elements in the display." That is, what counts for Establishment
Clause scrutiny is not the semiotics of the whole scene, but the semiotic meaning of adding particular religious elements to it.
Thus, even a display that may appear one hundred percent religious-say, Michelangelo's Pieta sculpture of Mary and the infantJesus
Christ in a New York City museum-would pass Establishment Clause
scrutiny because the purpose of including the religious sculpture in
the museum would not be a religious one in the sense of promoting
irrational faith or mystery over reason. It would presumably be to display one object of art expressing one artistic vision in a continuum of
artistic visions represented in the museum.
However, returning to Pawtucket, the most plausiblepurposefor taking the reindeer, robots, dancing bears, snowflakes, and candy
canes-signifiers that already amply express holiday spirit-and adding to them the Christmas nativity characters of Jesus, Mary, Joseph,
and the Wise Men would be precisely to endorse and promote the
particular religious faith and practice represented by these figures:
Christianity. Even if one claims that the purpose is simply to acknowledge the religious preferences of the majority, such a selective recognition has no rational secular purpose other than to endorse the
practices of a religious group. After all, why does the majority need to
have its preferences honored in this way?
Thus, if we keep our focus on governmental purpose, but amend
Justice O'Connor's test by asking not about the semiotics of the whole
display but about the purpose of injecting particular religious elements into it, the courts would not have much interpretive difficulty
analyzing the objective social meaning of challenged holiday displays.
As long as there is a recognizably religious element in such a display, it
constitutes an impermissible endorsement. The difference between a
museum display and a holiday nativity scene display is the difference
between teaching about the history of religions in a high school
"world religions" class and posting the Ten Commandments above the
blackboard. From a public vantage point, religion can be a perfectly
valid object of rational inquiry, empirical study, and artistic expression, but it can be no part of state-imposed dogma. This is not a complicated principle to implement. Thus, I reject the authors'
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"difficulty" thesis suggesting the need for a new interpretive methodology for ascertaining purpose.
III.

THE PARADOXES OF POLLING ESTABLISHMENT

There is, no doubt, a difficulty, and probably an intractable one,
in ascertaining "social meaning" in the sense the authors use it: the
meaning of a display or enactment in the subjective perception of society or particular group factions within it.37 Basing their endorsement analysis on this kind of social meaning-how people actually
experience an arguably religious government-sponsored display-the
authors recommend use of modern polling methodology and technology to determine whether respondents actually perceive a challenged
display or practice to be (1) governmentally sponsored, and (2) a religious endorsement. 8 They would borrow from the evidentiary techniques of determining consumer confusion in trademark law under
the Lanham Act."9 But, in the final analysis, this creative analogy to
trademark polling simply ends up demonstrating the incoherence and
indefensibility of relying on actual audience response to prove religious endorsement and, even more dramatically, Equal Protection
violations.
The essential problem is that basing constitutional injuries and
rights on the results of public opinion polling undermines the antimajoritarian underpinnings of the Bill of Rights. It goes without saying that " [t] he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts."4" If we would never want
to put rights to a vote, we certainly would not want to put them to a
poll, where there are even fewer procedural protections and the results are even more subject to manipulation. If a majority's perceptions should not be allowed to dictate the existence of rights in an
election, a majority's perceptions should not be allowed to dictate the
existence of rights in a poll.
One of the two main issues the authors would poll on is "whether
the government is seen as sponsoring or promoting the display."4 1
But let us imagine that a local government creates an indisputably
37. See Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 733-36, 736 (discussing "[t] he problem
of social meaning").
38. Id. at 736-56.
39. See id. at 736-38.
40. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
41. Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 749.
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religious display-say, Jesus Christ on the cross below a banner stating, "He died for your sins"-and places it in an empty park lot that
had been privately owned for decades, but is now suddenly owned by
the government because of a tax forfeiture (to almost no one's knowledge in the general public). Now, assume polling respondents overwhelmingly find that the display conveys a religious message, but also
overwhelmingly reply that they do not perceive the government to be
sponsoring or promoting the display. According to Diamond and
Koppelman, there would presumably be no impermissible governmental endorsement of religion, because people do not perceive it to
be a problem. But this hypothetical underscores the fact that what
should count is the objectively understood purpose of government in
mounting a religious display and, if we keep the formality of the effects test analysis in this context, what a reasonable person might reasonably perceive the actual purpose of government to be when all of
the relevant facts are taken into account.
Yet the authors might object that poll respondents in their plan
are not voting on the existence of the underlying rights, but rather are
participating in a survey that will objectively show whether the public
perceives a governmental religious endorsement to have taken place.
That is, the poll respondents are just helping to establish evidence of
endorsement. But if polling evidence is going to be the controlling
and determinative factor in whether endorsement exists, as the authors seem to suggest, then this mobilization of polling evidence does
become tantamount to a delegation of the Establishment analysis to
the public, or some portion of it, through a pollster. This judicial
deputizing to a polling group seems fundamentally irrational and at
odds with the vesting of the judicial power in the judicial branch. We
do not have to rely on people who have imperfect information-for
example, telephone polling respondents who do not know that the
government actually owns the property where a religious scene is being displayed-because we have a decisionmaker in the judiciary who
will have all of the relevant information that is available.
Moreover, to the extent that most Establishment problems present issues of majoritarian imposition of religious practices on minorities, it seems odd to return to the majority itself to determine whether
some practice constitutes endorsement. For example, a local bornagain Christian community that erects an Allegheny County-style Christmas scene at city hall is not going to perceive it to be an impermissible
endorsement, because most people do not view themselves as disregarding constitutional values. Leaving aside the deeply problematic
issue of strategic and deceptive answers-a problem that is flagged by
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the authors 42 -the unsolvable problem here is that majorities imposing religious endorsements on the rest of society view themselves as
upholding both their moral codes and American constitutionalism.
Conversely, such majorities would be much more inclined to find that
a minority religious symbol, even one that the Court has allowed, like
the menorah near the Christmas tree in Allegheny County, is in fact an
impermissible endorsement. In other words, the polling methodology reproduces the problem of majoritarian religious bias that the endorsement theory is designed to counteract.
Now, the authors might object that this critique is inaccurate because their approach does not credit the majority's perception of a sec-

ular character in a challenged practice, but rather seeks out a
minority's perception of a governmental religious endorsement. What
would count in this theory is the perception of some undefined "substantial portion" of the polling group of a religious endorsement.
But the vagaries of this plan just give the game away. For if we are
not going to rely on a suspect majority's impressions of secularism
(and surely the authors are right for Barnette reasons to reject that
tautology), then we are going to rely on a minority's impressions of
religiosity. But if no particular percentage of the polled public is required to find religious endorsement in order to strike it down, then
what is the utility of even having such a threshold requirement at all?
We already know from the fact that some plaintiffs have gone to court
to sue that there are at least some citizens who perceive a religious endorsement to be taking place. But adding the knowledge that another
five percent of the public agrees is like adding an amicus brief without
any legal analysis on behalf of those citizens. But the purpose of an
amicus brief is not to "vote" for the party's views, but to present novel
and original legal arguments or facts to facilitate the court's deliberations.4" If the authors are not going to commit themselves to a particular percentage threshold at which the perception of endorsement
becomes a binding force on the judicial determination of an Establishment Clause violation, then the court preserves discretion to decide. But what should the content of that discretion consist of? And if
it works in some cases, then why not in all of them?
42. See id. at 752-53.
43. Cf SuP. CT. R. 36.3 (explaining that "[w]hen consent to the filing of a brief of an
amicus curiae .. .is refused by a party to the case, a motion for leave to file .. .may be
presented to the Court" and stating that "[t]he motion shall concisely state the nature of
the applicant's interest, set forth facts or questions of law that have not been, or reasons for
believing that they will not adequately be, presented by the parties, and their relevancy to
the disposition of the case").
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If the authors do not actually go all the way to the end zone and
declare that a certain percentage in the polls will automatically operate to invalidate a challenged government display, then it is hard to
see how they are truly forwarding an audience theory of endorsement.
If they do go all the way and assert that ten percent is the magic number (a percentage they seem to flirt with 4 4 ), at this point we should
consider that an actual election is a more exact mechanism for determining public opinion than a poll, which is famously subject to manipulation. Why not have one election to determine whether we
should have a creche at city hall and then a separate one later to ask
citizens whether they view the creche as a governmental endorsement
of religion? If ten percent see it that way, it will be struck down, although it is hard to believe that the election results will be any different in the two elections. There are not many people who will take the
position that having the government display a Christmas creche is a
good policy idea but an Establishment violation or, conversely, that
displaying a Christmas creche is a bad idea yet constitutionally permissible. This is one place where judges and justices should earn their
salaries, as they are taught to distinguish between their political and
constitutional values.
IV.

POLLING

EQUAL

PROTECTION VIOLATIONS

The same problem is even more striking when we take up the
authors' rather dangerous example of polling in Equal Protection
Clause and racial segregation cases.4 5 They state that in Plessy v. Ferguson,46 'Justice Harlan tried to respond to the Court's obliviousness"
about the racism intrinsic to segregation "by pointing to what 'every
one knows"' to be true about the real purposes of Jim Crow.4 7 In his
dissenting opinion, Harlan stated that " [e] very one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude
white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude
colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons."4 8 But surely this was his nineteenth century way of stating that
any reasonableperson would understand this to be the objective purpose
44. See Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 753 (citing Henri'sFood Products Co. v.
Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1983), which noted that ten percent had been deemed an
acceptable level of consumer confusion in an earlier trademark case while nine percent
had been deemed a questionable level of confusion).
45. See id. at 756-60.
46. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
47. Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 759 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
48. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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and function of segregation in Louisiana's railcars; indeed, "[n] o one
would be so wanting in candor as to assert the contrary."4 9 This was
not idle assertion, as the authors imply, 5° but rather an effort to ex-

pose the majority for its hypocrisy and bad faith in denying what any
rational and honest person would have to believe and understand.
The authors suggest that Justice Harlan's problem "was that he
had no way to prove what he thought that everyone knew. It is, however, possible to compile such evidence, and such evidence can be
helpful . "..."51
Their rather astonishing suggestion, if I understand it
correctly, is that public opinion polling might have helped the Court
to determine the existence of Equal Protection violations in Plessy.
But it would be hard to find a more perfect demonstration of the
fallacy of using polling to define constitutional injuries. Is there any
doubt that public opinion polls taken at the time of Plessy would have
demonstrated that huge majorities of the population did not regard
race segregation as affixing a stigma or disability on African-Americans? The polls would have shown that the white majority saw segregation as fostering racial harmony, codifying healthy customs and
mores, treating the races alike, keeping social peace, and so on-anything but imposing white supremacy and racial stigma on the population. The "audience perception" method would have thus rejected a
stigma-based interpretation of segregation. The authors seem to for-

get that, in many crucial constitutional contexts, two key ones being
race segregation and symbolic endorsements of religion, the Supreme
Court has defied majority perceptions and attitudes and changed existing public opinion by fashioning new constitutional norms.5 2

49. Id.
50. See Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 733-34.
51. Id. at 759.
52. This was certainly the history of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
which toppled segregated schools (at least in theory), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962), which terminated the enormously popular practice of teachers conducting organized prayer in public schools. However, if the suggestion is, for example, that public opinion polls in Plessy or Brown would have shown that African-Americans saw segregation as
demeaning and stigmatizing, it is hard to see what this fact would have added to the
Court's understanding: these cases were already brought by African-Americans who had
overwhelming support in the black community, including, in the latter case, the support of
organized civil rights groups. See, e.g., Susan Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early
NAACP, 20 L. & HIsT. REV. (forthcoming 2002). The point is that we need Supreme Court
justices who are able to take into account the full breadth of society in envisioning the
meaning of public action for the purposes of constitutional analysis. Identifying and confirming such justices requires serious political action, but this is another story.
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CONCLUSION

At this point, we have arrived at the underlying tautology and irrationality of polling to settle constitutional conflicts-a startling suggestion which reflects not only the saturation of polling technology
and ideology in American society at the dawn of the twenty-first century, but also some deep loss of confidence in the ability of courts to
make reasoned decisions about the purposes of governmental action.
At a time when the conservative majority running the Supreme Court
is backing away from principled commitment to interracial progress
and is on a wavering edge about keeping church and state separate, it
is understandable for talented scholars like Diamond and Koppelman
to look for sources of interpretive authority other than "oblivious
judges."5 3 Indeed, if a majority on the Supreme Court is going to act
like a group of impulsive partisans in the nation's most important
election contest, 54 we can honor the attempt to reduce constitutional
adjudication to a series of audience survey questions directed at a
broader and more representative segment of the public. But we cannot assign the task of constitutional adjudication to the audience unless we want-and believe-the Constitution to be nothing more than
a popular Rorschach test and running crapshoot. The logic of this
approach will, of course, be the emergence of widespread television
advertising designed to convince people of what is and what is not an
Establishment Clause violation. If Constitutional boundaries are all a
matter of temporary subjective perception, the First Amendment
surely protects the right to change people's subjective perceptions of
those boundaries.
The solution to the admittedly serious problem of "oblivious
judges" is to nominate and confirm judges who have profound historical and social consciousness, wisdom, judgment, and a sense of the
deep values of the Constitution. We academics should certainly use
polls to figure out the state of the public's constitutional consciousness and to help educate people and legislators about constitutional
values. 5 5 But poll results-either of the majority or the minoritycannot settle constitutional conflicts and, in a democratic society committed to the rights of minorities, we should not want them to.
53. Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 1, at 759.
54. See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 542 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that
what has been lost as a result of the majority's decision "is the Nation's confidence in the
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law").
55. See generallyJAMIN B. RASKIN, WE THE STUDENTS (2000) (attempting to forward the
process of public constitutional education with great emphasis on Establishment Clause
values).

